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Brij V. Lal
Soldiers rioting on the steps of parliament house in Papua New Guinea;
tumultuous politics besetting the presidency in Vanuatu; political assassi-
nations in New Caledonia; confrontation between soldiers and civilians
on the troubled island of Bougainville. In other, calmer times, such inci-
dents of terror and violence would have stunned observers of Pacific
Island affairs. But in the aftermath of the dramatic events in Fiji, news of
upheaval in the islands is increasingly being greeted with a weary sense of
deja vu. Such has been their impact that the Fiji coups and the forces they
have unleashed are already being seen as marking, for better or worse, a
turning point not only in the history of that troubled island nation but also
in the contemporary politics of the Pacific Islands region.
The issues and emotions that the Fiji coups have engendered touch on
some of the most fundamental issues of our time: the tension between the
rights of indigenous peoples of the Pacific Islands and the rights of those of
more recent immigrant or mixed origins; the role and place of traditional
customs and institutions in the fiercely competitive modern political
arena; the structure and function of Western-style democratic political
processes in ethnically divided or nonegalitarian societies; the use of mili-
tary force to overthrow ideologically unacceptable but constitutionally
elected governments. These and similar issues, rekindled by the events in
Fiji, will be with us for a long time to come.
Unlike any other event in recent Pacific Islands history, the Fiji crisis has
generated an unprecedented outpouring of popular and scholarly litera-
ture, as our Book Review and Resources sections amply demonstrate.
Much of the early writing focused on the causes of the first coup (14 May
1987) and on the role of certain prominent individuals and institutions,
The Contemporary Pacific, Volume 2, Number I, Spring 1990,1-10
© 1990 by University ofHawaii Press
I
2 THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC· SPRING 1990
both within and outside Fiji, in instigating it. The apportioning of blame
and responsibility for the crisis continues, though perhaps with declining
vigor. Important evidence on crucial matters is still not available, and
many issues remain clouded by continuing controversy. But most serious
observers on both sides of the political divide have largely discarded the
early sensational theory of the rather large hand of external forces in pre-
cipitating the coups. No new evidence has come to light in the last two
years to sustain the charge of external causation. The increasing consen-
sus of both popular and scholarly opinion now is that the true reasons for
the coups will have to be sought in the class and communal dynamics of
local Fiji politics and history, and in the personal ambitions and fortunes
of specific individuals and groups threatened by the verdict of the ballot
box. But beyond that small island of agreement about where to look for
the causes lies a vast ocean of unending controversy about the motivations
and machinations that precipitated the present situation.
Rather than founder in that ocean, the essays in this special issue focus
on the impact and implications of the coups. Four of the six essays look at
their domestic social, economic, and political consequences, while the
remaining two examine their ramifications for regional politics and con-
stitutional theory. Our invited contributors come from different discipli-
nary backgrounds-history, sociology, political science, anthropology,
theology, law, and economics-and analyze events in Fiji since the coups
from a variety of scholarly perspectives. All of them have had a long per-
sonal as well as academic acquaintance with Fiji; some of them have even
been tangentially involved in the events of 1987: John Garrett, for exam-
ple, was a founding member of the Back to Early May Movement about
which he writes in his contribution. The analyses presented here are suf-
fused with different assumptions and values and degrees of detachment
from the subject. This is both unavoidable and desirable; no attempt was
made, or even contemplated, to require the contributors to conform to a
particular line of interpretation.
In their divergent opinions and positions, these essays convey a vivid
sense of the complexity of events in Fiji and underline the undesirability of
viewing them through a single fixed'lens, ideological or scholarly. Despite
the problems inherent in trying to decipher the meaning and significance
of a still-unfolding event, these essays go a long way toward facilitating a
deeper and more informed understanding of the events in Fiji and their
implications. I should add parenthetically that this collection of essays
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complements rather well the material covered in the Fiji publication,
Coup and Crisis: Fiji A Year Later (Prasad 1989), which provides a more
immediate and politically committed commentary on events in Fiji.
Yash Ghai's essay, which opens the volume, looks at an issue that may
at first glance appear to be moot. Politically it is: the coup succeeded, and
the military-backed regime currently in power is intent on keeping the
reins firmly in its own hands. But for legal and constitutional scholars
interested in the study of military coups and political revolutions in the
developing Third World, from Pakistan to Uganda, the Fiji coups, espe-
cially the first one, provide fresh material for comparative study. How and
under what conditions do extralegal seizures of power acquire the trap-
pings of legitimacy and constitutionality? What constitutional conven-
tions govern the power of a ceremonial or formal head of state, especially
in a crisis situation, when the elected government is unable or not allowed
to function? This second question is of direct relevance to several Pacific
Island states that have a Westminster-style constitutional structure similar
to that of precoup Fiji. Ghai's essay also provides the necessary back-
ground information on the sequence of events in Fiji in the early days of
the coup, setting the narrative context for the other essays.
Roderic Alley looks at how the Fiji coup was received in the region and
focuses specifically on the responses of the governments of Australia and
New Zealand. In the early stages, there was strong official condemnation
and much popular protest against the military overthrow of a fraternal
Labor government, and there were some short-lived, trade-union-Ied boy-
cotts against the military regime. There followed a period of vacillation
and uncertainty, but in the end both governments adopted an approach
"consonant with conventional foreign policy practice conducted by most
states." Self-interest, sensitivity to the charges of racial arrogance and bul-
lying tactics by the two white dominions, legitimate concern over the secu-
rity and future of Suva-based regional institutions, helped along by a con-
fused pattern of events in Fiji itself, all dictated a prudent and moderate
approach. In the islands themselves, where the coups were seen as a sim-
ple Fijian assertion of indigenous power against an immigrant racial
group, there was strong though usually private support for Colonel
Rabuka and his stated goals for his people.
The remaining four essays examine aspects of the impact of the coups
on Fiji's economy and society. Bruce Knapman expertly analyzes the eco-
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nomic consequences of the coups against the backdrop of development
trends in the country since independence in 1970. The basic challenge fac-
ing the economy, he says, is to grow-in the face of the flight of capital
and trained workers, shaky local investor confidence, and a predicted
downturn in the world economy-to provide employment, and to "accel-
erate Fijian participation in the cash economy." Some success in this direc-
tion has been achieved, especially with the creation of tax free zones of-
fering a thirteen-year tax holiday and other lucrative concessions to
primarily export-oriented companies. One result has been the burgeoning
of garment factories, which has brought some relief to a strained econ-
omy: more employment, a manageable inflation rate, and a stabilizing
foreign reserve. The interim government now confidently asserts that the
worst period of economic depression is over. But hidden behind promising
tax free zone statistics lie other problems. As Knapman notes, "Nobody
seems to have calculated the domestic resource cost of earning foreign
exchange by providing women and night-shift-working men in the zones
with a job that transforms an unemployment problem into a poverty
problem."
John Garrett provides important glimpses of social and religious life in
postcoup Fiji. Some of the earlier excesses and abuses of power have been
curtailed, Garrett notes, and there is silent accommodation and waiting
and apprehension among those opposed to the present regime. The coun-
try is still without a written constitution and is ruled by decrees; a severely
understaffed judiciary functions, not without some embarrassment; the
media, not directly under the control of the interim regime, operate with
prudent self-imposed censorship; and there is jockeying for power at vari-
ous levels, but most conspicuously in the once-united bastion of Fijian
conservatism, the Methodist church, to which most of the taukei 'indige-
nous Fijians' belong.
Beyond the public view, in the arena of domestic relations, and in the
garment factories where desperate unskilled women, many from broken
homes, earn as little as 65 cents an hour, far below the basic hourly casual
rate of F$r.35, life since the coups has taken a turn for the worse that no
pronouncements about imminent prosperity can hide. Shireen Lateef
looks into that grim world. When jobs are lost and wages fall, the women
are the hardest hit. To make matters worse, sexual abuse and rapes have
increased in the last two years. And women's struggle for equal opportuni-
ties, which had just begun to come into its own, is being undermined by a
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procoup nationalist ideology and a call to return to traditional, male-
dominated values.
The last essay, by Nicholas Thomas, takes us beyond ideologically
motivated explanations to the complex world of the Fijian response to the
current situation. The removal of the specter of Indian domination, a
powerful rallying point for Fijian national solidarity in the past, has
opened up old debates and contests for power among the taukei. The
most obvious, and potentially the most significant of these, has been the
formation of the fourth confederacy in western Viti Levu, the Yasasa
Vaka Ra. Its creation has been heralded by some as the harbinger of Fijian
discordance and invested with all kinds of meanings, even by Dr Timoci
Bavadra himself, who sees his Fiji Labour Party as "just the last in the line"
of "strong secessionist movements in the west of Fiji" (Davui, June I989,
6). Thomas examines this view, which sees a unitary, persisting pattern of
western dissent against eastern overlordship, and argues that western dis-
sent is the sum total of quite different individual acts of protest with spe-
cific causes lacking an overarching ideology. The east-west divide cuts
across different lines, depending on events, personalities, and circum-
stances. This, for instance, would explain why prominent western Fijians,
such as Ratu Josaia Tavaiqia and Apisai Tora, support Dr Bavadra's call
for a fourth confederacy and a greater national role for western Fijians,
but remain adamantly opposed to the principles of his multiracial Labour
Coalition. The idea of the fourth confederacy has been rejected by the
existing three confederacies. Whether this will eventually produce new
political alignments on the national political scene, for which the west has
a well-deserved reputation, is something that remains to be seen.
All the essays in this volume raise issues that will continue to be
watched and felt deeply by the people of Fiji and debated by scholars for
years to come. The prospects for speedy recovery and amicable national
reconciliation do not look promising two years after the events of I987,
but there is at least one reason for some relief. The much-predicted racial
bloodbath, which appeared imminent immediately after the two coups,
has mercifully not eventuated, despite all provocations and potentials.
Why? An important part of the reason is that the target group, the Fiji
Indians, has not done anything to provoke retaliation. Both culture and
common sense-all the guns are on the other side-dictate a prudent and
generally passive approach. As Eugene Genovese has remarked in another
context: "If a people, over a protracted period, finds the odds against
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insurrection not merely long but virtually uncertain, then it will choose
not to try. To some extent this reaction represents decreasing self-confi-
dence and increasing fear, but it also represents a conscious effort to
develop an alternative strategy for survival" (Genovese I979, 7).
The generally nonviolent reaction of Fijians is equally understandable.
The taukei are in the driver's seat, satisfied that their dream of political
supremacy enjoys much support across the wide spectrum of Fijian opin-
ion. Political and religious divisions-splits in the Methodist church, the
formation of the fourth confederacy-have diverted taukei attention to
other internal issues. And the militant, violence-threatening Taukei Move-
ment, which presented itself to the world soon after the coups as the
united voice of Fijian aspirations, has not surprisingly dissolved into quar-
relling factions. Its most extreme leader, Ratu Meli Vesikula, who once
threatened to put Dr Bavadra in the lovo 'earth oven', predicting that
"consensus will never be reached between Indians and Fijians" (Lal I988,
II4), is now quite firmly ensconced in the Coalition leader's camp (Davui,
June I989, 7) and, as irony would have it, the recipient of some harsh
treatment by his militant erstwhile comrades.
Two years after the coups, Fiji is still groping for a constitutional solu-
tion that, it is hoped, will kill two birds with one stone: enshrine Fijian
control of the political process, and get the other communities to accept a
subordinate place in the national political system. The basis for discussion
of dIe new constitution has been a hundred-page draft circulated by the
interim regime in September I988. It is very likely that, barring excep-
tional circumstances and with some minor modifications, this document
will become the constitution of the Republic of Fiji. The proposed consti-
tution is fundamentally different in spirit and content from the indepen-
dence constitution of I970. The latter was a carefully crafted instrument
founded on the values of balance, compromise, accommodation, and
political pluralism. Among other things, it prescribed a Westminster-style
participatory democracy with equal representation for Fijians and Indians
in the all-elected House of Representatives; entrenched provisions for the
protection of Fijian land and other rights that could only be changed with
the consent of the nominees of the all-Fijian Great Council of Chiefs in the
Senate; and an independent judiciary, free from political interference.
Power was in the hap.ds of the elected representatives of the people.
The new constitutional proposals envisage a different kind of society
and political system. This is not the place to offer a detailed assessment of
the proposed constitution, but some of its basic features should be noted.
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In the first place, the practice of parliamentary democracy with equal
franchise for all citizens is explicitly rejected and the power of the elected
legislature is subordinated to an unelectedexecutive branch. In the pro-
posed structure, the real power will lie in the hands of a small advisory
group in the Bose Levu Vakaturaga-as the Great Council of Chiefs is
now officially designated-which will appoint and, should the need arise,
dismiss the president, who will be accountable for his actions and deci-
sions only to that body. The constitution is vague on the role and function
of the Bose Levu, which will have a paramount role in the affairs of the
country. The presidency itself will be rotated on a five-year basis among
the three existing confederacies of Kubuna, Burebasaga, and Tovata. This
structure -of power sharing at the top explains the urgency of the western
Fijians' desire for a separate confederacy of their own.
Another feature of the proposed constitution is the principle"of unequal
representation and power in the parliament. The draft proposes a 7I-seat
unicameral legislature with 36 Fijians, 22 Indians, 8 General Electors, and
I Rotuman, even though the non-Fijians constitute the majority in Fiji.
Neither singly nor in combination will that majority be able to pass or
resist amendments that threaten their vital interests. The formerly fully
elected House of Representatives will, if the proposed draft is accepted,
also include nominees of rhe president (8 out of the 36 Fijians) and the
prime minister (4), who will enjoy all the powers and privileges of elected
members. .
The prime minister, appointed by the president, will be given wide-
ranging powers: he alone will be consulted in the appointment of the chief
justice, thus dispensing with the previously mandated consultative role of
the leader of the opposition, and his approval will be necessary for the
appointment of the director of public prosecutions. The prime minister
will always by law be a Fijian, as also will be the commissioner of police,
and the chair and at least one member of both the Public Service and the
Police Service Commission. Although these are not specifically stipulated
in the constitution, one can reasonably assume that the president, the
commander of the Fiji Military Forces, and perhaps even the chief justice,
will be Fijians. If the proposed draft is accepted, the most important and
powerful executive, legislative, administrative, and security posts will be
in the hands of the taukei, fulfilling the demand for the paramountcy of
Fijian interests in Fiji.
The new draft proposes to entrench communalism in the electoral sys-
tem. Under the new proposals, multiracial voting will be abolished and
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replaced with communal voting, with each ethnic group voting for its own
ethnic candidates. This is designed to foster ethnic political solidarity. But
the removal of any incentive for cross-communal dialogue will perpetuate
a divisive communal consciousness at the expense of an overarching,
cohesive sense of national consciousness. In the eyes of the draft's propo-
nents, though, the latter goal is not a desirable one.
Among the taukei, voting will be on provincial lines. No Fijian will be
eligible to be a candidate for the House of Representatives in any constitu-
ency except the one in which his landowning clan is registered in the Vola
Ni Kawa Bula, the Register of Births, with the result that Fijians will be
able to be parliamentary candidates only in the area where their clan is
located and not where they actually live. This provision, a triumph of pro-
vincialism, will frustrate the political ambitions of urban Fijians whose
traditional clans may be hundreds of miles away in a remote province,
where they might not be known and may not have lived for years. How
and if this will work in practice as the urban drift from the villages contin-
ues, remains to be seen.
A multiracial committee, chaired by Retired Colonel Paul Manueli, was
appointed by the interim regime to gauge the public's response to the new
draft. The exercise is designed to give the appearance of wide consulta-
tion, but the final say on whether the draft is acceptable or not will lie
with only one body, the Bose Levu Vakaturaga, which has from the outset
come out in favor of the paramountcy of Fijian interests to the exclusion
of everything else. It was no surprise that Dr Bavadra and the coalition,
now somewhat in limbo, rejected the draft constitution as "profoundly
authoritarian, undemocratic, militaristic, racist and feudalistic." Their
response, in a closely argued 48-page paper, went on to claim that the pro-
posal, if accepted, "would be divisive and sow the seeds of terrible vio-
lence. It would retard our social and economic development. It would
isolate us from our valued neighbours, the Commonwealth and the inter-
national community." Dr Bavadra reiterated his opposition to the draft in
June I989 when he said that his group "will not accept an apartheid solu-
tion" (Fiji Times, 26 June I989).
Within the Fijian community, though, there is widespread support for
the pro-taukei draft. The various provincial councils that have discussed it
have indicated either total support or have sought some minor modifica-
tions while agreeing on the ultimate goals of the new draft. Adi Finau
Tabakaucoro, former taukei academic at the University of the South
Pacific and presently a minister in the interim regime, said in I987, "I
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believe in the supremacy of Fijian interests in Fiji. If that makes other peo-
ple second class citizens, then-well, I don't have to say it." (New York
Times, 23 May 1987). More recently, Minister ofInformation Ratu Inoke
Kubuabola struck an adamant note when he said, "We will not shift from
our objective of ensuring Fijian political control along with indigenous
Fijians having a decisive and determining voice in the economy of Fiji"
(Fiji Times, 24 April 1989).
Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara himself, erstwhile multiracialist, has endorsed
these sentiments. He has said that the 1970 constitution, which kept him
in power for seventeen continuous years, may no "longer be regarded as
an adequate guarantee of their [taukei's] long-term future and as a suffi-
cient basis to ensure the long-term peace and harmony of the entire
nation." It must be revised to give full recognition to the "overriding
importance that the indigenous Fijians attach to the communal values of
duty and loyalty to the unity and harmony of their community and of obe-
dience to, and respect for, their traditional chiefly authority" (Fiji Times,s
May 1988). The Fijian people must learn from history and make history
and not become history in their own native land. In language more remi-
niscent of the militant Taukei Movement than anything else, Mara told
the meeting of the Lau Provincial Council on 10 May 1989, almost exactly
two years after the first coup, "The Fijian people are all too aware of the
destiny of the indigenous Aztecs of Mexico, the Incas of Peru, the Mayans
of Central America, the Caribs of Trinidad and Tobago, the Inuits of Can-
ada, the Maoris of New Zealand and the Aborigines of Australia, to name
a few" (Fiji Times, II May 1989).
This was an extraordinary statement from an extraordinary man at the
twilight of an extraordinary career, lending support to the discomforting
thought that the difference between Mara and Rabuka is one of degree,
not one of substance. Ratu Sir Kamisese has expressed his intention to
retire from politics at the end of 1989. He has made similar announce-
ments in the past only to be persuaded at the last minute to remain in
office, all for the sake of his people and his country. He may linger on the
political stage for a little while longer, like an important guest wearing out
his welcome. But the situation has changed: he is sixty-nine years old, in
failing health, and no longer quite the man in charge, at least not to the
degree he has been accustomed to. His political competitors include Briga-
dier General Sitiveni Rabuka, who has hinted at retiring from the military
to lead the country as a civilian (PIM, June 1989). In a different Fiji, which·
he had a large hand in shaping, Ratu Sir Kamisese would have made a tri-
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umphant exit, extolled for his commitment to constitutional democracy
and genuine multiracialism; now, in the eyes of all but his most ardent
supporters, he will depart the political scene with his star on the wane, his
reputation diminished, and his place in history uncertain.
What is the outlook for Fiji two years after things fell apart? John Gar-
rett puts it this way: "Beyond the doors things to come remain unclear,
hypothetical: reassuring consensus or renewed crisis? People in uniforms,
with or without hand-held firearms, are still in evidence and say they are
ready if needed." In the words of Dr Samuel Johnson, which will probably
find acceptance among most people on both sides of the political divide,
life in contemporary Fiji is in a "state in which much is to be endured and
little to be enjoyed."
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